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Web Workers for Software Attestation
ABSTRACT
Theft of browser authentication cookies is a serious security problem. Cookies stolen,
e.g., by copying from disk and transmitting to another machine the cookie jar of a web browser,
can grant substantial, unauthorized account access to the thief. This disclosure describes
techniques to protect cookies by creating a web platform based isolated service for an
authentication domain. The isolated service creates an ongoing measurement of the on-origin
actions taken to provide an attestation that the browser session in use is the one that the server
has been interacting with. The isolated service runs as part of the browser using web workers,
which is tamperproof from normal web platform APIs and does not depend on on-disk data. The
techniques provide a generic mechanism for binding user sessions to a given browser without
relying on explicit device identity in cryptographically deprived environments. By avoiding disk
persistence of cookies, the techniques thwart both web and memory attacks.
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BACKGROUND
Web browsers store cookies to enable website access and reloading by the browser user
across process restarts. Cookies are stored on a backing store such as a disk or other storage
device. With such a setup, if a malicious actor is able to execute malware in the user context, it is
possible for the cookie to be collected and used on other devices controlled by the malicious
actor. Cookie theft can be performed by binary malware that simply copies the browser cookie
jar from the disk or other storage device. Since cookies are bearer tokens for web application use,
access to a user’s cookies can grant substantial and unauthorized power of access (login) to the
malicious actor who steals the cookie. The harmful effects of unauthorized access can include
account theft, data loss, etc.
Various web services use the browser to store cookies to provide long-lived credentials
relating to an identifiable session, authenticated or not. Depending on their usage, cookies may
last only for the life of the browser task or may be written to disk. Regardless, updates to a
cookie, and therefore session information, require the browser to visit, reload, or continue on the
web origin that created the cookie.
Risk heuristics can be deployed to detect cookie misuse and upon detection, the user can
be requested to re-authenticate with a knowledge factor or other shared secret. However, such reauthentication procedures can be costly and cumbersome. Detection of cookie theft in (near) real
time is challenging since it depends on effectively binding a cookie to the device of issuance and
being able to validate proof of binding on subsequent transactions.
Cookies (or other) data on disk can be protected by having a separate, trusted-service
store such that access via the filesystem is infeasible by normal users or by the browser user
session. Alternatively, cookie data can be protected from theft by using encryption services
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provided by the operating system (OS), by using obfuscation tactics, etc. Attestation techniques,
used in content protection, game consoles, browsers, OS, etc., assert either information about the
state of the operating system or assert that specific cryptographic key matter is guaranteed to be
protected by specified policy compliant software and hardware configurations.
A web worker (or service worker) is a script that runs in the background of a browser.
Web workers are separate from a web page and enable features that do not need a web page or
user interaction.
DESCRIPTION
This disclosure describes techniques to protect cookie data by creating a web platformbased isolated service for an authentication domain (e.g., the accounts domain of web services).
The techniques are implemented with user permission.
With user permission, the isolated service (also known as service worker, which runs in a
protected space of the browser) creates an ongoing measurement of the on-origin actions taken
by the user to provide attestation that the browser session in use is the same one that the server
has been interacting with. The isolated service runs as part of the browser using web workers,
which cannot be tampered with using normal web platform application programming interfaces
(APIs) and which do not depend on on-disk data.
Per the techniques, a service worker is instantiated for each web service or website. The
service worker is seeded with user and session-specific data, with specific user permission. This
data and subsequent site-specific events are used to compute rolling datasets. The service worker
presents an interface that enables the initial seeding and future data mix-ins, as well as queries
against its data that yield ephemeral attestation. For example, the worker can run a hash-based
message authentication code (HMAC) or time-based one-time password procedure. Additionally,
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if the site uses the service worker as a network proxy, all requests can be annotated with an
assertion.
Cookie theft is detected by creating a session-bound attestation mechanism that isn’t
solely dependent on other symmetric secrets, like device fingerprinting. Even if the service
worker is initiated with symmetric secrets, the longevity of the binding and continual
advancement of the session state increases the burden for cookie theft/reuse to proceed
undetected. Indeed, even a fork in the worker state can become apparent if the server tracks its
session cookie and its session service worker states in tandem. In such a case, cross-site request
forgery (XSRF) protections are also provided, where the service worker is queried for an XSRF
token variant of its data (versus appended as a proxy).

Fig. 1: Software attestation using web workers: bootstrap or refresh
Fig. 1 illustrates an example sequence of interactions between a browser web page, a web
worker, and a web server to perform software attestation during bootstrap or refresh, e.g.,
creating a new attestation token proof or updating an existing one. The browser sends an initial
request to the server. The server installs the attestation web worker. The web worker is seeded
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with a hashed token (which is a secret shared between the worker and the server) that comes
through an encrypted session cookie.
The hashed token can also be derived from or signed by a hardware security key based,
e.g., on the WebAuthn standard or another similar standard. The worker periodically regenerates
the token using hash chaining such that the new token is a hash of a random event timestamp, a
cryptographically random number from the machine, and a previous hash (Merkle tree). The new
hash (token proof) is signed with the old token, e.g., the one inside the cookie. The new hash is
registered on the server and the session cookie thereby updated, e.g., the token proof is
augmented with an expiration timestamp, encrypted, and signed. The web server returns the new
attestation token proof to the web worker. The procedure is repeated as necessary.
Effectively, a state is built within the web worker through the use of hash chaining such
that parts of the input are machine specific, e.g., secure crypto-random. Frequent updating of the
hash makes it difficult for a token to be used with a different device and prevents the building of
a session.

Fig. 2: Software attestation using web workers: Verification

Published by Technical Disclosure Commons, 2021

6

Defensive Publications Series, Art. 4738 [2021]

Fig. 2 illustrates an example sequence of interactions between a browser web page, a web
worker, and a web server to verify software attestation. The browser web page fetches the
attestation token proof from the web worker and transmits it to the web server for purposes of
verification. The web server decrypts and verifies the token proof, unpacks its expiration
timestamp, and, if the token proof is determined as valid, returns a normal application response
to the browser. If the token proof is determined to be invalid or expired, an error is logged and
returned to the browser.
In this manner, the techniques described herein secure browser-only cookies, local or
session data by saving them in the protected memory space of the browser rather than writing
them to disk. With such a configuration, an attacker who attempts to take over the user’s
computer has to examine its memory, including protected browser memory, to find the cookies, a
very time-consuming procedure. If at all an attacker is able to discover and access the cookies,
the attestation token of the browser would’ve changed and rendered obsolete, thereby foiling the
attack.
The techniques can be used by any website that can create web workers or similarly
isolated, long-lived jobs. Similarly, a browser or user agent can natively include the described,
memory-only, state transition based attestation. The techniques effectively provide a generic
mechanism for binding user sessions to a given browser without relying on explicit device
identity in cryptographically deprived environments, e.g., without requiring hardware-backed
secure zones. The techniques avoid disk persistence of cookies, thereby thwarting web attacks
that attempt to extract internal states and/or memory attacks to extract original state, while
maintaining a low client-interaction latency.
Further to the descriptions above, a user is provided with controls allowing the user to
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make an election as to both if and when systems, programs or features described herein may
enable collection of user information (e.g., information about a user’s browser, a user’s
preferences, or a user’s current location), and if the user is sent content or communications from
a server. In addition, certain data may be treated in one or more ways before it is stored or used,
so that personally identifiable information is removed. For example, a user’s identity may be
treated so that no personally identifiable information can be determined for the user. Thus, the
user has control over what information is collected about the user, how that information is used,
and what information is provided to the user.
CONCLUSION
This disclosure describes techniques to protect cookies by creating a web platform based
isolated service for an authentication domain. The isolated service creates an ongoing
measurement of the on-origin actions taken to provide an attestation that the browser session in
use is the one that the server has been interacting with. The isolated service runs as part of the
browser using web workers, which is tamperproof from normal web platform APIs and does not
depend on on-disk data. The techniques provide a generic mechanism for binding user sessions
to a given browser without relying on explicit device identity in cryptographically deprived
environments. By avoiding disk persistence of cookies, the techniques thwart both web and
memory attacks.
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